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INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE  
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE  
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC  
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC  
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5612  
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL  
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL  
RUEATRS/US TREASURY WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000855

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, S/CT, SA/A, G KATE  
FRIEDRICH, G/IWI CHARLOTTE PONTICELLI AND DIANNE GRAHAM  
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND  
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PINR](#) [PTER](#) [AF](#)

SUBJECT: PRT FARAH - ASSESSMENT OF 10 FEBRUARY ATTACK

Classified By: A/POL COUNSELOR MARY TOWNSWICK FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

¶1. (C) Summary. PRT Farah was attacked by rockets and mortar rounds, followed by small arms fire, in the early morning of February 10. Although no injuries or damage occurred, the well-coordinated attack demonstrated the growing sophistication of anti-Coalition elements. This and similar events this year indicate the ACM and their allies are attempting to increase their influence in Farah Province. The PRT is reassessing the Farah environment and taking operational and tactical precautions to prepare for further hostilities. End Summary.

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The Attack  
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¶2. (C) A 27 minute attack rocked PRT Farah at almost exactly 0100 on February 10. The attack comprised four 107 rocket rounds and eleven 82mm mortar rounds, followed by small arms fire. It was carried out by three separate groups, requiring a level of coordination and synchronization not usually seen in Farah. NDS and ANP recovered a car battery believed used for launching 107 rockets and a 30 meter detonation cable used to fire the rockets.

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Where,d They Come From? Where,d They Go?  
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¶3. (S/NF) On February 12, GOA officials met with PRT Commander and PRT Poloff to assess further action. GoA officials included Provincial Governor Isatullah Wasifi, NDS Chief Naqshband, ANP Commander Agha and ANA 1/1 Kandak Commander LTC Ghulam Hassan. GoA officials believed at least 18 men were responsible for the attack against the ISAF PRT. Initial evaluations indicate they were Taliban members from Helmand and/or Nimroz Province who traveled north to Shewan in Bala Balouk District to initiate the attack. It is believed they traveled to Bakwa District after the attack. With a sparse population, flat terrain and arid weather

conditions, Bakwa is an area notorious for narcotics-related activities. As GoA security presence outside of Farah City are minimal, law enforcement is difficult. GoA officials assured the PRT the perpetrators coerced local villagers into providing assistance, and did not receive it voluntarily. Naqshband and Wasifi agreed that while Bakwa District Manager, Asadullah Noorzai, might not be an open Taliban sympathizer, he was ineffective as a manager and most likely complicit in the narcotics trade. (Note: The PRT commander stated the U.S. planned to build a road through Bakwa, but the project would be on hold until the District Manager was replaced. Plans to rebuild the recently burned high school will progress as scheduled. End Note.)

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Just Say &No8(With Firepower  
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14. (S/NF) Wasifi pushed for fast action and a strong show of force. He recommended coordinated ANA/ANP/PRT action with Helmand and Nimroz provincial security forces and helicopter support from the PRT. Wasifi claimed he was already in contact with the governors of Helmand and Nimroz. He felt swift, decisive action would result in saying &no to drugs and Taliban.8 The PRT Commander questioned Wasifi,s knowledge of the other governors' loyalties and ties to the perpetrators. The PRT commander agreed that an Afghan security force action would be appropriate, but did not promise U.S. action or assets. Agha said the ANP would make arrests, but requested further resources and support. (Note: The majority of the ANA Kandak is in Herat indefinitely, so Kandak involvement is tentative. End Note.)

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Links to Other Hostilities  
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15. (S/NF) GoA officials agreed the same individuals who attacked the PRT probably placed, or are linked to those who placed, the IED on February 7 which killed four employees of Gulsan Cukurova, the Turkish company constructing the Ring Road. NDS Chief Naqshband said we should expect at least one more local attack, and that the group might be planning to increase its presence in Bakwa.

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The Forecast  
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16. (S/Rel ISAF) GoA officials said the weather was a large factor in the level of anti-government activity in Farah. As the weather became colder in the northern provinces, anti-government activities increased in Farah. Wasifi believed the trend would continue well into Farah,s summer. The curfew of 2300-0500 remains in effect.

17. (S/NF) Comment: This attack was the most violent perpetrated against the PRT to date and demonstrated a new level of organization and resolve. Swift or coordinated Afghan action is unlikely. Local forces lack the resources and training required to be effective. A likely suspect is Mullah Baz Mohammed, coordinating with Taliban in Nimroz and Helmand. Baz Mohammed has a history of involvement in anti-government and anti-Coalition activities in Farah. He is known to run kidnapping rings; he is suspected of organizing the August 31, 2005 kidnapping/murder of USPI employee David Addison; and he was present in the area the night of the February 7, 2006 IED attack on the USPI convoy. Another suspect named by GoA officials is Mullah Allouf, who is unknown to the PRT. GoA officials claim he was recently released from Gitmo and is currently active in Bakwa. The PRT is reassessing the Farah environment and taking operational and tactical precautions to be ready for further hostilities. End Comment.

